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1
Introduction

In a series of exchanges with James Madison, Thomas Jefferson argued that
constitutions should be rewritten every generation, declaring famously that
the “dead should not govern the living.”1 Jefferson derided those who “look at
constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the
covenant, too sacred to be touched.”2 He even proposed an expiration date –
one of nineteen years, a figure he came to from studying a set of actuarial
tables.3 Madison, having only recently shepherded the U.S. document through
a sometimes contentious deliberation and ratification process, saw more merit
in constitutional longevity. The two carried out their lively debate by mail
in two very different contexts: revolutionary France, where Jefferson served
as the inaugural U.S. ambassador, and the United States, where Madison
was busy putting the new American charter into effect. Although those two
countries seemed to be headed in a similar institutional direction as beacons
of democracy in the late eighteenth century, their constitutional trajectory
would be markedly different. Why is it that the inaugural constitution drafted
in Philadelphia in 1789 has survived for 220 years and counting, whereas the
French Constitution of 1791 lasted a little more than a year, to be followed
in French history by fourteen more constitutions? Indeed, an old joke has it
that a man goes into a library and asks for a copy of the French constitution,
only to be turned away with the explanation that the library does not stock
periodicals.
France, it turns out, is more typical than the United States with respect
to constitutional life span. Our data show that most constitutions die young,
and only a handful last longer than fifty years. At the extreme, the island of
1
2
3

Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789. See Hamburger 1989: 280.
Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816.
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789; Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12,
1816.
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Hispaniola, home to the Dominican Republic and Haiti, has been the setting
for nearly 7 percent of the world’s constitutions and perennial governmental
instability. Indeed, the life expectancy of a national constitution in our data is
19 years, precisely the period Jefferson thought optimal!4
Investigating national constitutional histories shows a great diversity of patterns, with some countries and regions exhibiting great instability, and others,
great stability. These patterns may vary over time within a particular country.
The cases present puzzling contrasts. Why, for example, have the Brazilians
followed the French pattern, writing seven charters since 1824, whereas the
neighboring Argentines have made do with the same constitution since 1853,
albeit with significant reforms in 1994? Why has the unwieldy Indian constitution persisted since 1948, whereas its neighbor Pakistan has written three such
constitutions, each of which was suspended by military coup? Why, in short,
do some constitutions endure, whereas others fail?
DESIGN VERSUS ENVIRONMENT

The answer to these questions seems obvious. Constitutional death, one might
think, is epiphenomenal and merely reflects other changes that occur in a
country’s history. Some countries have led tumultuous lives since their initial constitution – with wars, coups, and crises of all kinds – whereas others
have led less “interesting” lives, to use the Chinese euphemism. Surely, then,
those historically volatile countries should have more unstable constitutional
lives than those whose history is more tranquil. But, are the political, economic, and social histories of the United States, Argentina, and India really
less combustible than those of France, Brazil, and Pakistan? How closely is
constitutional change really tied to historical “shocks” and the larger environment? Are there other factors associated with the constitution itself that put
the constitutional system at greater or lesser risk?
For us, these questions point to a distinction in the explanatory power of
design versus environmental factors, a distinction with highly normative implications. Consider design factors as those having to do with the content and
drafting process of the constitution itself and environmental ones as those
pertaining to the international and national environments that host the constitution. The design versus environment distinction is roughly comparable to the
classic behavioral debate in biology that pits the forces of nature versus those
4
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of nurture. Like design, nature is relatively fixed for any individual organism,
whereas nurture varies infinitely. However, the parallel breaks down in one
crucial respect: the class of factors that is most malleable is reversed between
the two domains. The design, or nature, of the constitution – unlike human
DNA – is very much a product of human engineering, whereas the constitution’s environment – unlike biology’s nurture – is the less manipulable of the
two sets of factors. This reversal shifts scientific priorities: with respect to both
human and constitutional mortality, it is more imperative to understand those
conditions we can do something about than those we cannot (the institutional
scholar’s version of the “serenity prayer”). So, although health professionals
may gravitate toward studying the effects on mortality of remediable human
behaviors like exercise and nutrition, and control for genetic predispositions,
we do just the opposite. The hardwired genetic code of constitutions is ours
(collectively) to engineer and thus worthy of extra attention.
In our theoretical approach, therefore, we are quite consciously open to
the possibility that constitutional drafters can affect the durability of their
designs. The alternative, perhaps prevailing, view is that constitutions are
almost entirely at the mercy of fortuna, coming and going only as major world
events wash them away. This latter view, it would seem, is based not only on
the transformative power of wars, economic crises, and the like, but also on the
widespread assumption that institutions are sticky, and constitutions the stickiest of them all. Consequently, many accounts of institutional change, such
as those influenced by the concept of punctuated equilibrium in evolutionary
biology (e.g., Krasner 1984), tend to emphasize environmental shocks over
institutional structure. An understandable presumption with respect to constitutional change, then, is that exogenous shocks are a sufficient, perhaps even
necessary cause. In his thoughtful book on Canada’s constitutional history,
Peter Russell (1993: 106) articulates this notion most emphatically: “No liberal
democratic state has accomplished comprehensive constitutional change outside the context of some cataclysmic situation such as revolution, world war,
the withdrawal of empire, civil war, or the threat of imminent breakup.”
Such a view, in which constitutional change is merely epiphenomenal,
would seem to render constitutional design nearly irrelevant to constitutional
mortality.
Nevertheless, our theory (which we introduce later) suggests several risk
factors inherent in constitutions themselves that merit investigation. It is possible that the general expectation regarding the power of shocks is just that,
an expectation – a highly intuitive one, perhaps, but one that has not yet been
empirically validated. Some scholars have suggested as much, arguing that the
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literature on institutional change has underestimated the incidence of change
unassociated with crisis (Cortell & Peterson 1999; Pierson 2004). In the case of
constitutional change, any such error would be fully excusable, as no systematic empirical test of constitutional duration is on record as far as we know, and
anecdotal evidence provides some examples that seem to confirm the power
of environmental shocks in inducing change. However, linking a precipitating
event to the time of death does not constitute a complete autopsy. In retrospect,
it is easy to attach too much explanatory power to events simply because of
their coincidence. A civil war that seems to have so obviously foretold the end
of a constitutional system will seem lethal (to constitutions) only afterwards.
Also, some events (e.g., political coups) are likely to result, to some degree,
from underlying instability produced by constitutional provisions and, therefore, may be merely mediating factors. These possibilities imply two analytical
strategies in assessing cause of death. The first is to identify and measure
the effect of all crises, not just events in periods coinciding with constitutional demise. The second is to investigate the underlying structural causes of
constitutional instability. These structural risk factors may be aspects of constitutions that render them more or less resilient than others, or some political,
social, or economic conditions that render the state more or less hospitable
to constitutional survival. The test of our theory follows this more comprehensive analytical approach. We seek, therefore, an opportunity to correct an
imbalance in the attention paid to the environment at the expense of design
in the study of institutions, of which constitutions constitute an important
species.
None of this is to say that the environment is not worthy of study. Indeed,
we cannot resist plunging into questions of environmental effects. Among
the questions that we investigate: what are the consequences for constitutional change following a shift from democracy to authoritarianism, or vice
versa? Are newly installed democrats and new authoritarians equally likely
to replace the existing constitution? Does it matter whether the constitution
that transitional actors would replace was originally written by democrats or
by dictators? What about constitutional change within stable democratic and
authoritarian regimes: is the constitution equally stable under these two systems? What also are the various effects of major state events such as a defeat
in war, a loss of territory, or a severe economic crisis? Do they all imperil
constitutions?
And what of time? Have constitutions become more stable since the early
1800s? If so, which risk factors, if any, have waxed or waned to produce these
trends? Does the age of the state matter? Burke, Rousseau, and Hegel were
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famously skeptical of the positivist notion that we can implant constitutions in
newly formed states, suggesting instead that institutions need to grow organically. Are inorganic constitutions in new states any more brittle than those of
countries with more settled institutional customs? Do we observe any effects
of birth order, such that a state’s second-, third-, and fourth-born constitutions
are increasingly more stable? Apart from these questions regarding the age
of the international system or its states, are there aging effects with respect
to the constitution itself? We know that marriages, to which constitutions
might arguably be compared, show a very distinct pattern in the hazard rate
across time: these unions enjoy an initial honeymoon period of low risk, only
to become especially combustible at the age of six years or so, after which
they grow increasingly stable (Aalen and Gjessing 2001). Are constitutions like
marriages in this sense? Do they exhibit any discernible patterns of decay or
crystallization as they age? All of these are intriguing questions in their own
right – and we seek to engage them – but they are subsidiary to our central issue
regarding the effects of constitutional design on constitutional endurance.
WHAT GOOD IS CONSTITUTIONAL ENDURANCE?

Before exploring the determinants of mortality, we consider the normative
question: how long should constitutions last in a democracy? Surely, longevity
is not desirable as an end in and of itself and, as Jefferson suggested, it may even
be pathological. Chapter Two explores the merits of Jefferson’s conjecture and
Madison’s response, as well as other theoretical and practical arguments for
and against durable constitutions.
Often, normative discussions of this kind have a rather abstract quality,
which sometimes allows would-be Madisons and Jeffersons to talk past one
another. We regard many of the claims and assumptions in this particular
debate as eminently testable. Chapter Two, therefore, also evaluates empirically a series of hypotheses implied by the various claims. Among other
questions, we consider whether endurance is associated with important social
and political goods, such as democratic participation, economic development,
national unity, and political stability, and whether constitutional replacement
can be said to update otherwise anachronistic or outmoded institutions. We
also explore empirically the critical question of whether periodic replacement
of the constitution impedes its ability to serve as a constraint on ordinary
law and practice, a central function of constitutions. Our findings on these
questions are mixed, with support for both Madison and Jefferson, and their
followers. Nevetheless, we are most struck by a general finding that most of the
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purposes that are ascribed to constitutions, such as entrenching fundamental
principles or providing normative guidance for the polity, seem to improve
with age.
WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION?

Our approach assumes that we can identify a set of laws as the “constitution” in
a comparable manner across centuries and continents. Chapter Three grapples
with this crucial conceptual question of constitutional definition. For many,
constitutions have become shorthand for political institutions more generally.
Recently-written constitutions such as Brazil’s 1988 document, which attempt
to constitutionalize nearly every aspect of public life, have not helped to circumscribe the definition. Other countries such as Britain, Israel, and Saudi
Arabia have unwritten or uncodified constitutions. To add even more confusion, countries such as New Zealand and Canada accumulate a set of important
documents over a period of years until, at some point, scholars determine that
the collection is too important not to be a constitution, whether or not the texts
were consecrated as such. Constitutions also evolve through ongoing interpretation, such as by high courts engaging in constitutional review or legislatures
interacting with executives. Finally, societies have unwritten norms of political
practice that bear an ambiguous relationship with the formal written text. The
scope of the unwritten constitution poses daunting challenges to comparative
research, and we acknowledge the importance of such norms, but, ultimately,
we defend the idea that the written constitution – a product of unique and
discrete social practices – is itself an object worthy of study.
Chapter Three also provides a methodological introduction to the data on
which this study is based. As noted, our data cover the constitutional history
of every independent state from 1789 to 2005, a period that includes 935 different constitutional systems for more than 200 different nation states, both past
and present. Defining constitutional life span is not always a straightforward
task given the frequency of constitutional amendment – some of which sometimes entail significant revisions – alongside the phenomena of constitutional
suspension, reinstatement, and replacement. In introducing our census of
constitutions, we are then in a position to engage in a set of empirical tests
of the validity of our conceptual approach. These tests include an analysis
of the gap between the written text and de facto constitutional practice, an
assessment of the degree of change in content associated with constitutional
replacements versus amendments, and an exploration of the coincidence of
constitutional change and regime change, two closely related but empirically
distinct concepts. As in Chapter Two, our approach to Chapter Three is to
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contribute a set of empirical findings to a persistent debate that mostly operates
at an abstract level.
A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

To understand the effect of design on constitutional mortality, one needs to
understand what constitutions do and what pressures, exactly, lead to their
demise. This book elaborates just such a theory of constitutional formation,
adjustment, and endurance. Our theory operates on two very different levels
in terms of causal proximity. At its most proximate, our theory describes the
process of constitutional crisis and death. This is the constitutional equivalent
of a description in a medical textbook of the breakdown of vital organs, complete with detailed micro information about tissue and cells. At a more remote
level, however, our theory needs to connect these processes to genetic predispositions, activities, or conditions that might increase the risk of breakdown. It
is one thing to describe the physiological details of cancerous cells and their
threat, and still another to connect the onset of cancerous tumors to human
behavior and genetic code. The same is true of constitutional mortality. We recognize the importance of both levels of theory and devote a full chapter to each.
Chapter Four presents our physiological theory of constitutional change.
Because we recognize that constitutional change is a subspecies of institutional
change (though a very important subspecies), the discussion is informed by
the rationalist tradition in institutional analysis and, in particular, the growing literature on self-enforcing institutions. We assume that constitutions are
bargains among elites that are meant – at least by their authors – to be enduring. Unlike normal contracts, however, there is no external guarantor who
will enforce the agreement, independent of the parties. A constitution will be
maintained only if it makes sense to those who live under its dictates, so a
crucial quality of any successful constitution is that it be self-enforcing. This
means that those within the constitutional bargain must have a stake in the
successful implementation of the document for it to endure. Even though
constitutional bargains may have relative winners and relative losers, they will
endure to the extent that parties believe they are better off within the current
constitutional bargain than in taking a chance on, and expending resources
in, negotiating a new one.
Our model of endurance also imagines that a political bargain, once adopted, will be stable so long as it is not subject to either endogenous or exogenous
shocks, such as financial crises, armed conflict, or the death of a long-serving
leader. Such shocks change the calculus of costs and benefits for parties
considering whether to remain in the constitutional bargain. In the real world,
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however, such shocks are endemic: currencies plunge, invasions occur, and
new technologies are invented that empower some actors, but weaken others.
The question then becomes whether there are any features of the constitution
that can render it more resilient in the face of shifting conditions. We focus on
three such features: constitutional flexibility, the inclusiveness of the constitution, and the level of detail and scope of coverage in the constitution, which we
call specificity. Chapter Four describes these concepts, how they interact, and
how they facilitate endurance. Flexibility represents the constitution’s ability
to adjust to changing circumstances, and is captured in the empirical analysis
by the ease of formal and informal amendment. Constitutions can be changed
through both formal processes as well as interpretative changes that update the
understanding of the text among relevant actors. Inclusion captures the degree
to which the constitution includes relevant social and political actors, both
at the time of drafting and thereafter. Inclusion facilitates both enforcement
of the constitution as well as investment in its endurance. Specificity refers to
the breadth of coverage and level of detail of constitutional provisions, and we
explain why it is that detailed documents may be more enduring than general framework documents so celebrated in American constitutional thought.
These three features, we believe, are crucial for facilitating constitutional
endurance.
Chapter Five develops the behavioral component of our theory. There,
we connect the processes of constitutional negotiation and renegotiation to
the predispositions of constitutions and the conditions under which they live.
These hypotheses regarding factors of design and environment follow directly
from our physiological theory, and we develop their connection to constitutional replacement in some depth. A venerable maxim in political science –
the rule of three – recommends that analysts restrict the number of explanatory factors to three (Achen 2002). We violate this rule reluctantly by looking
at a wide range of factors, but do so with good reason. First, given that our
epidemiological analysis forges new ground, our intent is to report the effect
of a host of factors that are of interest to us, and, perhaps, to suggest others
undeveloped in our account, which may be explored more fully by future
researchers. Second, given the prevailing view that environmental factors are
fully determinative of constitutional mortality, we are interested in assessing
the impact of constitutional design above and beyond a full set of competing
environmental hypotheses.
THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH

We take an explicitly multi-method approach to testing the empirical implications of our theory. The central line of attack is an epidemiological one,
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set forth in Chapter Six, in which we explore patterns in the mortality of
almost the full population of national constitutions since 1789. This analysis provides valuable insights, but is limited in ways we describe shortly.
The basis of the epidemiological analysis is a set of original data – the
Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) data – which we began collecting in 2005. The data set records a large set of characteristics of each and
every constitution written since 1789. The project has entailed considerable
investment in unearthing the constitutional chronology of states (e.g., identifying years of constitutional amendment, replacement, suspension, etc.),
collecting the texts for each constitutional change, and coding the relevant
characteristics of these documents. Our analysis of the endurance of constitutions represents our first comprehensive use of these data. These data
provide some important opportunities, not only for its wealth of information
regarding constitutional design, but also because of the expansive scope of the
sample.
We became more appreciative of these advantages when we stumbled upon
the classic study of mortality in ancient Rome by Durand (1960). With an
exceptionally clever research design, Durand analyzed data on the dates of
birth and death on tombstones found in various Roman ruins. Understandably,
Durand was sensitive to issues of selection bias in the sample, particularly with
respect to gender and class. Even with this very truncated set of data, Durand
was able to tell us a great deal about baseline mortality rates and differences
in mortality between different segments of the Roman population.
In our case, we are fortunate to have public records of the birth and death of
most of our subjects as well as a wealth of historical information about many
of them. Not only that, but we believe that we have identified the complete
universe of cases, not just a reasonable sample. We thus take the ambitious
step of analyzing constitutional endurance across all cases. We recognize that
constitutions are born and die in a wide range of circumstances, and our global
approach will fail to account for many individual cases. On balance, however,
the global approach allows us to draw broad conclusions about constitutions,
which apply across many countries and eras.
In a second line of attack, we devote Chapters Seven and Eight to case studies
that explore what we have come to think of as autopsies and family histories.
The autopsies explore very carefully the demise of particular constitutions,
whereas the family histories focus on a country’s series of constitutions. Much
of the evidence we consider in these chapters is in the form of what Brady and
Collier (2004) have called causal process observations (as opposed to data set
observations). The focus on a particular case (or series of cases) of constitutional
replacement allows us to examine the sequence, timing, and relevance of
various risk factors and to assess cause of death more precisely.
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In our design of the case study research, we examine two different samples
that we draw sequentially using first a “most similar systems” design (Chapter
Seven) and then a “most different systems” design (Chapter Eight). We sample
countries (not constitutions) and explore both the patterns of constitutional
endurance across countries as well as the variation in endurance within countries. The latter within-country analysis provides added analytical leverage by
multiplying instances of constitutional mortality while effectively controlling
for a host of environmental and genetic factors. The across-country analysis
compares national trajectories and allows us to look more systematically at
issues of sequence and legacy. Although we take a rather structured approach
to the set-up of the case-oriented material (with an eye towards hypothesis
testing), our hope is that the case studies take on a less didactic narrative style
with the more general purpose of illuminating the concepts and processes
invoked in our theory.
CONCLUSION

Written constitutions are central institutions in the political order and powerful
symbols of statehood. As a normative matter, most designers and scholars seem
to assume that they should endure. Yet, in many times and places, constitutions are remarkably ephemeral. Establishing an enduring constitutional
scheme appears to be quite difficult, particularly in new democracies outside of Western Europe and North America. This instability may have real
consequences in an era in which constitutions are centerpieces of political
reconstruction (Arjomand 2007) and foreign policy (Elkins, Ginsburg, and
Melton 2008; Feldman 2005).
Alas, we have, to date, very little knowledge about how to create more enduring constitutions (Negretto 2008; Ordeshook 1992; Sutter 2003; Weingast 2006).
This book is a modest effort to bring the issue of constitutional endurance to
the fore. By documenting the phenomenon of constitutional mortality and
examining the various environmental and design factors that influence constitutional life span, we hope to answer some questions, but, at the same time,
raise others for further analysis in comparative constitutional studies.
Our central point is a simple one: design choices matter. Our evidence
confirms that scholars have been right to respect the influence of environmental crises and conditions on constitutional change. However, up to certain
thresholds, more flexible constitutions that include a wide range of social
actors and provide some amount of detail seem to endure longer than those
that do not. These choices may also make constitutions more democratic,
although this is not our overriding normative concern. Indeed, as we shall see
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in the next chapter, it has been argued that endurance may have some positive consequences independent of the content of constitutions. Regardless,
we expect that constitutional designers will continue to struggle for a stable
anchor for politics in a world of constant change and we hope that this book
will provide some perspective on this struggle.

